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Thousands of printed pages and a near-infinity of spoken words
have been lavished on the question whether the language of McNaugh-
ten, Durham, or something else should supply the law's test of criminal
responsibility. Yet the only empirical evidence available indicates that
the words of the test are not very significant; jurors decide cases in
much the same way under any of the standards.' Far more significant
functionally are the evidence the jury is permitted to hear, the wit-
nesses through whom evidence is presented, and the manner in which
lawyers and experts approach their tasks. Most important, however,
is whether the accused has a psychiatrist at all to aid him in making
his defense. Nevertheless, for all the preoccupation with the wording
of the insanity test, virtually nothing has been done systematically to
* This Article will eventually appear, in revised form, in a book being written
by the principal author in collaboration with Judge David L. Bazelon of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Judge Bazelon's
comments are gratefully acknowledged, as is the assistance of Professor Jerome
Skolnick, formerly of the Yale Law School, and now in the Department of Sociology,
University of California at Berkeley. Funds for the research were provided by the
Foundations' Fund for Research in Psychiatry.
fProfessor of Law, Yale University. B.B.A. 1946, City College of New York;
LL.B. 1949, Yale University.
:: Tutor in Law, University of Puerto Rico. A.B. 1951, Barnard College; LL.B.
1957, Harvard University.
I James, The People v. Martin Graham: Legal and Lay Attitudes Toward
Mental Illness, 1957, unpublished University of Chicago jury Project; James, Jurors'
Assesmnent of Criminal Responsibility, 7 SocIAL PROBLE S 58, 68 (1959).
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assure that a psychiatrist will be available at the times when he is most
needed. The problem is a general one, but it is obviously most acute
for the indigent, who comprise a high percentage of the so-called
criminal classes.
A shift in focus, from the words of the insanity defense to the
practices and institutions surrounding it, is long overdue. This Article
will begin the process by considering the procedures available to the
indigent accused who asks the state for the assistance of a psychiatrist.
I. THE ADVERSARY MODEL AND THE PSYCHIATRIST
Our initial premise is that an "adequate defense" requires that the
accused be equipped to learn whether he has a defense and, if he does,
to present it effectively at trial. This follows from the assumptions
which underly an adversary system. Such a system is fashioned from
a model which presupposes that men, their testimony and their con-
cepts are inevitably "biased," that they are shaped by different back-
grounds, value systems, personalities, and perceptual equipment. In
accordance with this model, roles are assigned to specially motivated
persons, the parties and their counsel, which call upon them to make
the best possible case for their side2 The parties present "their" wit-
nesses, "their" versions of events, "their" theories of law. Such a
model requires that the parties engage in a constant process of "cor-
rection" of the adversary's material. Witnesses must be penetratingly
cross-examined, opposing versions of events comprehensively pre-
sented, and conflicting legal theories crisply propounded. In short, the
model presupposes that the parties are roughly comparable in legal, in-
vestigative, and expert resources. The system will not function well
if they are not. In the case of the indigent accused, there can be no
illusion that he comes prepared "equally" with the prosecution to par-
ticipate in an adversary process 3 or that complete equality can ever be
2 It is assumed in the text that the indigent accused raising the question of his
mental condition will be represented by counsel. Yet there is no certainty that one
will be provided for him. Under the sixth amendment, indigent criminal defendants
in the federal courts have a right to assigned counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462-65 (1938). In state courts, the right exists in capital cases and in other
cases in which, on the particular facts, it is essential to a fair trial. Taken into
consideration in non-capital cases are the defendant's age, education, experience,
mental capacity, and the nature of the offense with which he is charged. Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633, 636-38 (1959) ; Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-73 (1942). Where the right exists, "effective assistance"
must be provided. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73 (1932); Diggs v. Welch,
148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). See generally BEANEY,
THE RIGHT TO CouNsEL IN AMERICAN CouRTs (1955).
3 The generalized procedural advantage enjoyed by the state with respect to
pre-trial disclosure is discussed in Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Crimninal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1180-92 (1960); Louisell,
Criminal Discovery-Dilemmia Real or Apparent?, 49 CALmr. L. Rnv. 56 (1961).
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achieved. Nevertheless, substantial equality is certainly a minimal
condition in a procedural system oriented towards a fair trial.
The assistance needed to assure substantial equality and an "ade-
quate defense" will obviously depend upon the particular defense in
issue. Handwriting experts will be needed in one case, ballistics ex-
perts in another, and investigative aid in yet a third. When the de-
fense is insanity, two issues immediately arise: first, whether a psychi-
atrist is essential to the presentation of the defense; second, the extent
to which he need be available and the capacities in which it is necessary
that he function.
The cases repeatedly say that expert testimony is not "essential"
to raise the insanity defense; lay testimony alone, often that of friends
and relatives, will suffice to carry the issue to the jury.4 Yet it is clear
that only the grossest of aberrations will be persuasively presented
through such witnesses.5 Moreover, the person alleging insanity at
the time of the crime is not likely to appear very aberrant at the time
of trial. In most jurisdictions, he may stand trial and interpose in-
sanity only if he is "competent to stand trial." 6 This means that, at
the very moment when he is trying to persuade the jury of his past
"insanity," he is sufficiently rational to understand the proceedings and
to cooperate in his defense. To persuade a jury that someone who
behaves as they do was insane at some prior date is an almost im-
possible task, however artfully the legal distinction between compe-
tency and insanity may be drawn.7  Only rarely will it suffice for the
defendant to present witnesses to his past life. In the overwhelming
majority of cases, he cannot expect to succeed unless he can present an
expert witness to bridge the gap between past unreason and present
reason in the language and manner of the polished professional.
4 In Maine, Massachusetts, and New York, severe restrictions are placed on the
admission of lay opinions as to mental condition. In the other states, lay opinion on
sanity is generally admitted. It must, however, ordinarily be based upon the lay
witness's personal knowledge of the underlying facts. Everywhere, of course, the
"facts" themselves may be presented through lay witnesses. 7 WIGMoR, EVIDENC E
§ 1938 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1962).
5 See Address by Shirley Star, "The Publics Attitude Towards Mental Illness",
National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1955.
The defense of insanity may occasionally be made by a person found later to
be incompetent. This occurs in the ten or eleven states following the common-law
position which gave the trial judge discretion to submit both issues-competency to
stand trial and insanity at the time of the crime-to the jury simultaneously. WEI-
HOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 456 (1954). As to the question
of competency to stand trial, see generally id. at 428; LINDrAN & MCINTYRE, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 357 (1961); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 961 (1943).
7There is wide variation as to defendant's burden of proof. In about half the
states, the defendant must prove his irresponsibility, usually by a preponderance of
the evidence. Elsewhere, and in the federal courts, the prosecution bears the ultimate
burden, so that it is technically sufficient for the defendant to raise a reasonable doubt
as to his sanity. See WEIHoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 212-72
(1954).
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There is another reason for characterizing the psychiatrist as an
essential witness. Many, perhaps most, jurisdictions permit, invite, or
require a psychiatrist to testify to his conclusions regarding the de-
fendant in the very words of the test of criminal responsibility.8
Though lay persons may also be permitted to testify in these terms, it
is obvious that a psychiatrist testifying for the prosecution to the ab-
sence of "mental disease" or "mental defect" appears better qualified
than a layman testifying to the contrary. Similarly, the testimony of
a psychiatrist for the prosecution that the defendant "knew right from
wrong" or that he "knew the nature and quality of his act" has a ring
of authority which no layman can duplicate.'
The conventional assertion that expert testimony is not "essential"
to raise the insanity defense, therefore, means little more than that the
defense may be submitted to the jury on lay testimony alone. In
practical terms, a successful defense without expert testimony is likely
to come only in cases so extreme, or so compelling in sympathy for
the defendant, that the prosecutor is unlikely to bring them at all. In
marginal cases, psychiatric testimony for the defense is unquestionably
necessary, particularly because prosecutors invariably produce experts
to describe as "normal" what lay testimony for the defense had sought
to picture as "abnormal."
It is far easier to agree on the importance of the psychiatric wit-
ness to the defense than on the functions he should perform. All too
often it is assumed that he is needed only to examine the accused before
trial and to appear as a witness at the trial. Yet if the issues are to
be clearly defined and developed by the parties in the manner con-
templated by an adversary system, it will be necessary for him to do
much more. Expert testimony does not arise full-blown. It must be
prepared with a sensitive concern for the context in which it is to be
presented. Problems of communication must be met and overcome.
Stereotypes entertained by lawyer and expert must be dispelled. As-
sumptions and workways must be explored and understood.
The very first contact between lawyer and psychiatrist, the request
that a mental examination be performed, provides a useful illustration.
8 United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. 498, 546 (1882) ; KING & PILLINGER, OPINION
EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 230-31 (1942) ; WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIINAL
DE=NsE 284-85 (1954) ; 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1921 (Supp. 1962). Contra, State
v. Palmer, 161 Mo. 152, 173-74, 61 S.W. 651, 657 (1901); GLUECK, MENTAL Dis-
ORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 309 n. (1925).
9 In experiments conducted at the University of Chicago, using actual jurors and
real but recorded cases, it was concluded that "most jurors granted to the experts the
recognition appropriate to their specialized training and greater knowledge?' Greater
weight was given to testimony based upon personal examination than to that based
upon hypothetical questions. No significant difference was noted, however, in the
effect of long, detailed, and straightforward reports as opposed to those stating tech-
nical conclusions. James, Jurors' Evaluation of Expert Psychiatric Testimony, 21
OIo ST. L.J. 75, 95 (1960).
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Unless each has some sense of the purpose of the examination, it will
not be satisfactory one. If, for example, that purpose is to ascertain
competence to stand trial, it may call for different procedures than if
the purpose is to determine sanity at the time of the crime or to deter-
mine whether civil commitment is presently warranted.Y The length
and nature of the interviews, the need for psychological and neuro-
logical tests, the gathering of the defendant's life history "-all will
depend upon the degree to which the lawyer understands where the
psychiatrist's competence ends and that of psychologists, neurologists,
and other specialists begins, and the degree to which psychiatrists
understand enough about a trial to appreciate their limited role in it.
Ideally, this preparation will make clear to the psychiatrist that
his testimony is merely one stage in a series of phased presentations
of material; that the ultimate objective of his testimony and of the
rules of evidence which control its presentation is the portrayal of this
defendant and his act in terms meaningful to judge and jury. In
pursuit of that objective, he must not be tempted to out-lawyer the law-
yers. ie is not obligated to manipulate concepts to attain objectives
he thinks desirable; nor is he obligated to offer his opinion on matters
of which he has no knowledge.
If this exploration of issues does occur before the psychiatrist
conducts his examination, it will inevitably educate the lawyer in some
of the intricacies of psychiatry so that he will be better equipped to
perform his role. The lawyer who is unfamiliar with the point at
which knowledge of mental life slides over into conjecture can hardly
be expected to examine his own witness skillfully, much less his ad-
versary's, or to make intelligent decisions about the kinds of witnesses
he needs to prove or disprove various illnesses. ie must be familiar
with the usage of terms like "schizoid" or "paranoid," their relation to
the psychoses of schizophrenia or paranoia, the distinction between an
acute state and a state of remission, the psychotic's often rational be-
havior, and the manner in which hallucinations and delusions differ
from daydreams and firm convictions. In short, if the lawyer is not
to become the agent of a mindless anti-intellectualism, he must learn
10 See Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 848 (1961) ; Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 364 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
11 A detailed life history should be prepared in most cases. Conducted by a social
worker, the study should result in a description of the defendant's school and work
experiences, his contacts with courts, family service agencies, psychiatric clinics,
mental hospitals. See generally ENGLISH & FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHlATRY,
70-100 (2d ed. 1957) ; NoYES & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 130-69 (5th ed.
1958). The psychiatrist need not have examined the defendant in order to testify.
Defendant's life history and the circumstances surrounding the act he committed may
be supplied in the form of a hypothetical question. It is generally agreed, however,
that this type of testimony is confusing to the jury and of less value than testimony
based upon the psychiatrists personal observations.
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from his psychiatric witness where points of bona fide disagreement
exist and how much ought properly to be made of them. 2
In such a close working relationship, the psychiatrist can play
a very real part in the development of witnesses and in the clarification
of issues. Indeed, even legal issues are better defined when both
psychiatrist and lawyer analyze rigorously what it is the law requires
from the psychiatrist. For example, does the psychiatrist have the
appropriate information when the law asks whether the accused knew
right from wrong at the time of the crime? Is "mental disease" a
useful concept upon which to ground the insanity defense? Or would
it be preferable to base it on psychosis? Assuming the former, should
it be held as a matter of law that a schizophrenic suffers from mental
disease and a psychopath does not? Or should judicial notice be
taken? "I If the lawyer understands enough psychiatry to present these
issues to the courts, there will be a sharpening of focus and a clearer
delineation of relevant issues.
If an accused is to raise an "adequate" insanity defense, he will
need the psychiatrist in all of the capacities described above. He will
need the psychiatrist as a witness. He will need his aid in determining
the kinds of testimony to be elicited, the specialists to be consulted, and
the areas to be explored on cross-examination of opposing psychi-
atrists. And he will need him as a creative contributor to the develop-
ment of the law in this field. 4
II. PATTERNS OF PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE
The indigent accused seeking psychiatric assistance will find sev-
eral patterns of case and statute law. 5 In some states, his plea of in-
12 See generally HOLLINGSHEAD & REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS
28-29, 155-65 (1958); JAHODA, CURRENT CONCEPTS OF POSITIVE MENTAL HEALTH
(1958) ; SZASz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961) ; WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND SoCIAL PATHOLOGY 203-67 (1959); Bowman & Rose, A Criticisn of the Terms
"Psychosis," "Psychoneurosis" and "Neurosis," 108 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 161 (1951);
Friedman, Conformity and Nonconformity, in PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 41 (Hoch &
Zubin ed. 1955) ; Hartmann, Psycho-analysis and the Concept of Health, 20 INT'L J. OF
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 308 (1939); Stouffer, Indices of Psychological Illtess, in THE
LANGUAGE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 63 (Lazarsfeld & Rosenberg ed. 1955); Weihofen,
The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1960).
13 See generally Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 945, 952-59, 966-67
(1955).
14 Clearly, these functions will involve varying degrees of identification with the
parties. At some almost imperceptible point in the conversations between an expert
and the lawyer who seeks his testimony, there is a risk that the psychiatrist may
become so involved with the party for whom he appears that his judgment may be
distorted. This is, of course, a problem common to all witnesses. Once the risk is
pointed out, however, the adversary process should serve as a correction to excess
zeal. See text accompanying note 55 infra. The ideal solution-which would pro-
vide the defense with two psychiatrists, one to testify and one to assist in the trial
-is not possible in view of the limited resources presently available.
15 The several patterns of case and statute law found among the states are pre-
sented in the Appendix, pp. 1092-93 infra.
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sanity will bring into play provisions for appointment by the court of
"impartial experts" to examine him without regard to his indigence.
In others, he may petition the court to appoint a psychiatrist of his
choice at state expense. Where there is a public defender, there may
be a fund available for the payment of expert witnesses. And in some
states, the accused may have several sources upon which to draw. For
example, in California, Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island,
there are at least four different procedures. Yet in ten other states,
there is no procedure available for the indigent to obtain psychiatric
aid, other than the general subpoena power. In the states between the
two extremes, there is great variation. What emerges is a patchwork
of devices instituted at various times in almost random fashion to ac-
cord the accused protection ranging from optimal to none. These
devices will be examined in order to determine what is available to the
indigent accused and what should be made available to him if he is to
be assured an "adequate" insanity defense.
A. The Impartial Expert Statutes
The most common of the procedures are the statutes providing
for court appointment of a psychiatrist in cases involving insanity or
incompetency. These statutes, which exist in thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia, 6 do not turn on indigence. Their original ob-
jective was to eliminate through the introduction of an impartial ex-
pert, the "battle of experts" which had been, in the eyes of many,
discrediting both psychiatry and the insanity defense.' Nevertheless,
3
6 ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 425 (1959) (limited to capital cases); Alx. STAT. ANN.
8843-1301 to -1303 (1947), as amended, §§ 43-1301 to -1312 (Supp. 1961); CAL.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 1027; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-2 (1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-40 (1958); Dn. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5142(c) (1953) (authorizes state
mental hygiene clinic to "observe, examine, study, and treat any person charged with
any offense . . . when requested to do so by a judge or judges thereof."); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 917.01-.03 (1944); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 258-36 (1955); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-1702 (1956); Ky. REv. STAT. § 203.340 (1959) (limited to habitual crimi-
nals); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:267-69 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 27,
§ 118 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 7, 11 (1957) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123,
§§ 99, 100A (Supp. 1961); MIcE. STAT. ANN. § 28.967 (Supp. 1961); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 135.17 (1955); N.Y. CODE CRmI. PRoc. §§ 658-62; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 122-91 (Supp. 1961); N.D. REv. CODE §§ 29-20-01, -03 (1960); OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2945.40 (Page 1954); OPE. REv. STAT. § 136-150 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, §§ 1222, 1225 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-17-19 to -20 (1956); S.C.
CODE § 32-927 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-513(5) (Supp. 1961); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-24-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4803 (1959); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.1-228 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. §6193 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 957.27 (West 1958) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-241 to -242 (1957) ; D.C. CODE ANN.
§24-301 (1961). In the footnotes that follow we shall refer to these sections without
repeating the citations. A similar provision is applicable to federal criminal trials.
18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958).
17 See articles cited note 37 infra. There was a period when some courts held
that court appointment of an expert violated the principle of separation of powers.
It was said to involve an abandonment by the judge of his neutral position and a
tacit expression of his opinion to the jury. People v. Dickerson, 164 Mich. 148,
153-55, 129 N.W. 199, 200-01 (1910). A few more recent decisions express a similar
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by authorizing the appointment of a psychiatrist at government ex-
pense, they do make available a witness where there would otherwise
be none. Appointment under these statutes may come when either the
prosecutor, the court, or the defense asserts that the defendant is not
competent to stand trial. Or it may come when the accused interposes
the insanity defense."
There are two types of examination procedures which sometimes
exist alongside each other. The first involves commitment to a mental
hospital,' the second, designation by the court of a psychiatrist to
examine the accused either in the jail or in his office."0 Whichever
procedure is used, the examination is ordinarily made by a psychi-
atrist employed by the government. In fourteen states and the District
of Columbia, these are staff members of the state mental hospital or
mental health department."' In five others, a government psychiatrist
must be a member of an examining commission appointed by the
court.m In twelve states, in the federal courts, and under the Model
Penal Code, any competent, disinterested expert may be appointed,
including a government employed psychiatrist." Indeed, where psychi-
view. People v. Scott, 326 Ill. 327, 345-47, 157 N.E. 247, 255-56 (1927) ; see People
v. Pugh, 409 Ill. 584, 588, 100 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1951). But the overwhelming cur-
rent of authority since Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 186-95, 231 N.W. 634, 636-39
(1930), has found court appointment of an expert to be "a most appropriate!' judicial
function, ancient in origin, and offering great advantage in the search for truth.
See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 20 So. 2d 186, 190-93 (1946); People v.
Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522, 300 Pac. 84 (1931); Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa.
36, 44-45, 173 A.2d 468, 472-73 (1961).
'8 Where the issue is competency to stand trial, the defendant cannot always be
expected to demand an examination for himself. But where insanity at the time of
the crime is in issue, most states require that the defendant plead insanity before
the procedure can be invoked. In California, Colorado, and Indiana, the court is
required to invoke the procedure whenever the insanity defense is raised. In Ten-
nessee, either defense counsel or prosecution may apply. Under the statutes of
Arkansas, Florida, New York, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia, the
judge has explicit statutory authority to invoke the procedure without a request
from the defendant. See statutes cited note 16 supra. As a practical matter, this
authority in the court may depend upon the prosecutor's "suggestion" that the statutes
be used. The problem of judicial assertion of the insanity defense, over the defend-
ant's objection, has recently become a much controverted one. See Overholser v.
Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1961), refd, 369 U.S. 705 (1962); Halleck,
The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-A Legal Lorelei, 49 GEo. L.J.
294, 316 (1960).
'9 See, e.g., CoLo. Rs v. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-2 (1953).
20 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 917.01 (1944).
2 1 Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New York, North Carolina, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont,
Wyoming, and the District of Columbia.
22 California, Colorado, Louisiana, Virginia, and Ohio. In Ohio although the
patient is to be under observation by the state hospital staff, the court may appoint
physicians who are not staff members to the examining commission.
23Under MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), and in North
Dakota and Wisconsin the court may choose between a government hospital staff
member or another competent disinterested physician. In the federal courts and
those of Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah and West Virginia, the judge may select any neutral expert;
use of a government employed psychiatrist is permissible.
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atrists are scarce, courts are compelled to draw on government em-
ployees if they are to comply with the mandatory provisions of laws
requiring psychiatric examination.2 4
Typically, the statutes contain no statement of minimum qualifica-
tions for the examiner. 5 In practice, either state hospital personnel
will be used or the examiner will "be selected by the judge, often as-
sisted by suggestions from counsel, on the basis of his and their knowl-
edge of the medical community. In only a handful of places are pre-
pared lists used. 6 In California and Oregon, they are often prepared
with the cooperation of the local medical association."
Nor do the statutes detail the kind of examination to be con-
ducted. The judge is not obligated to instruct the expert on the ques-
tions his examination should prepare him to answer and the role he is
to play in the proceedings. Most often, the judge will do no more than
explain briefly the applicable test of competency or responsibility.2"
The amount of time spent by the examiner may vary from one-half
hour, as in one city in Michigan," to twelve hours in a city in Ohio."0
In mental hospitals, the commitment period may be for several weeks,3'
but this indicates very little about the proportion of that period actually
2 4 LA. Oi's. ATTI'Y GEN. 432 (1938-40). In North Dakota, "the court usually
sends the defendant down to the State Hospital for observation. The reason is simply
that there are not psychiatrists available elsewhere in general." Communication from
William S. Murray, Att'y, Bismarck, N.D.
The term "communication" is used in the footnotes throughout this Article to
designate the raw research material collected in conjunction with writing the Article.
As here used, it includes questionnaires, covering letters, memoranda, other letters,
and informal documents, received in October and November, 1961, unless otherwise
indicated. All of the material is on file in the offices of the principal author, and of
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
25 In many states, the expert need not even be a psychiatrist. See note 44 infra
and accompanying text.
26 Communications from Mark Brandler, judge, Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal.;
Perry A. Maynard, Michigan State Bar Comm. on Crim. Jurisprudence, Lansing,
Mich., Feb. 13, 1962; John Holloway, Oregon State Bar Ass'n, Portland, Ore.
2 7 Communications from Lewis Drucker, Judge, Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal.;
John H. Holloway, Oregon State Bar Ass'n, Portland, Ore. In New York the court
also often seeks the advice of the medical society. Communication from Alexander
Herman, Asst. Dist. Att'y, New York County, N.Y.
2
8 E.g., communications from William S. Murray, Att'y, Bismarck, N.D.; A. H.
Ellett, Dist. Judge, Salt Lake City, Utah; Richard S. Kaplan, Indiana State Bar
Ass'n Medical Legal Comm., Gary, Ind. In California the examiner is supplied with
a form including, inter alia, the following items: "Kindly make an examination of this
defendant and report your findings to the court as to the defendant's
was the defendant sane at the time of commission of offense? Is he sane at the
present time?" Communication from Mark Brandler, Judge, Super. Ct, Los Angeles,
Cal.
29Communication from Perry A. Maynard, Michigan State Bar Comm. on Crim.
Jurisprudence, Lansing, Mich.
30 Communication from Ralph Robinson, Psychiatric Clinic, Crim. Ct., Cleveland,
Ohio.
31 E.g., Tennessee (30 days); Wyoming (60 days).
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devoted to examination of the accused. Upon completion of the ex-
amination, reports must be made and copies furnished to the court,
the prosecution, and defense counsel, but little guidance is given as to
their contents.3 About half of the responses to our questionnaire
indicated that the reports contained only conclusions.33 In a few
states, the reports contained some additional information about the
patient's life history, his present condition, and his history of mental
disorder. 4
If the court-appointed expert supports the insanity defense, then
the indigent defendant's needs are met, at least in part. However,
none of the statutes specify whether defense counsel may call upon the
"impartial expert" to aid him in preparing his caseY5 This function
may well go unfilled and, indeed, ordinarily does. If, on the other
hand, the psychiatrist should support the prosecutor's case, then the
indigent accused will remain without any psychiatrist to bolster his
defense. Indeed, he will be worse off than before since the prosecution
may now have as witnesses both its psychiatrist and the "impartial"
expert.
32A typical statute provides only that the hospital staff member is "to conduct
observations and investigations of the mental condition of the defendant, and to pre-
pare a written report thereof." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1301 (Supp. 1961).
33 Communications from J. S. Tarwater, M.D., Alabama State Hosp., Tuscaloosa,
Ala.; John M. MacDonald, M.D., Colorado Psychopathic Hosp., Denver, Col.;
William J. T. Cody, M.D., Hawaii State Hosp., Kaneohe, Hawaii; Bruno Radauskas,
M.D., Spring Grove State Hosp., Baltimore, Md.; J. 0. Crist, M.D., Lima State
Hosp., Lima, Ohio; William S. Hall, South Carolina State Hosp., Columbia, S.C.;
Superintendent, Vermont State Hosp., Waterbury, Vt.; Theodore G. Denton, M.D.,
Central State Hosp., Petersburg, Va.; James A. Ryan, M.D., District of Columbia
General Hosp., Washington, D.C., March 8, 1962.
3 4 Communications from H. L. McPheeters, M.D., Conn'r of Mental Health,
Louisville, Ky.; D. A. Pooler, M.D., Bangor State Hosp., Bangor, Me.; Emile Grun-
berg, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, East Bridgewater, Mass.; John L.
Smalldon, M.D., New Hampshire State Hosp., Concord, N.H.; Prison Ward, Belle-
vue Psychiatric Hosp., New York, N.Y.; H. S. Barahal, M.D., Pilgrim State Hosp.,
West Brentwood, N.Y.; Walter A. Sikes, M.D., Dorothea Dix Hosp., Raleigh, N.C.;
William P. Camp, M.D., Norristown State Hosp., Norristown, Pa.; William N. Karn,
Jr., M.D., Wyoming State Hosp., Evanston, Wyo.
The fees paid for these examinations varied widely, in obvious relationship to
the time and care devoted to the tasks. Questionnaire responses indicate that the
usual fee is $150 in Louisiana (William J. O'Hara, Judge, Crim. Dist. Ct., New
Orleans, La.); $100-250 in Ohio (Ralph Robinson, Psychiatric Clinic, Crin. Ct.,
Cleveland, Ohio) ; $100 in Connecticut (Judge Thim, Super. Ct., New Haven, Conn.).
Elsewhere it is slightly lower, e.g., $24-100 in West Virginia (Ralph E. Pryor, Judge,
First Judicial Cir., Wellsburg, W. Va., Feb. 3, 1962); $35 in California (Lewis
Drucker, Judge, Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal.); $35 in Oregon (James W. Crawford,
Judge, Cir. Ct, Portland, Ore.).
35 It seems clear the defense counsel may at least call the expert as a fact witness,
and cross-examine him if he is called by the court or prosecutor. The most that is
expressly provided with respect to his aid in the preparation of the defense is that
names and addresses of such experts be furnished to defense counsl (Louisiana and
Ohio), that the written report be made available to him (Alabama, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, and Hawaii) and that he may call the expert as his own witness (California,
Colorado, Rhode Island, and Utah). See note 16 supra. Occasional consultation
between the examiner and the prosecutor or defense counsel is reported, mainly to
prepare the expert for testifying and to aid in cross-examination of opposing witnesses.
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Though most statutes do not explicitly provide for designating
the witness as court appointed, such designation occurs virtually every-
where." Indeed, every judge and commentator who has discussed the
desirability of court appointment has noted the fact of court designa-
tion in arguing that it is a necessary corrective to the "partisan" battle
of experts.3 7 As a consequence, judge and jury tend to believe the
court's "impartial" expert. Similarly, prosecutors dismiss proceed-
ings and defense counsel forego reliance on the insanity defense in
accordance with the "impartial" psychiatric opinions s Court appoint-
ment may, therefore, result not only in an additional psychiatrist for
the prosecution, but in one whose opinion is likely to be overwhelmingly
convincing. If this added aura coincided with an added ability to find
the "truth," it might be difficult to reject the method producing it,
even if it seemed to work against the indigent accused. It might then
be said that the state's obligation to assure substantial equality had
3 6 In Wisconsin, the designation is explicitly required. Accord, MODEL ExPERT
TESTIMONY AcT § 8. Elsewhere, as in Indiana, the designation follows implicitly
from the fact that the expert's evidence follows that of both prosecution and accused.
IND. AN. STAT. § 9-1702 (1956). In still other jurisdictions such as Louisiana and
Ohio, the designation is brought home to the jury by the fact that the expert is
examined by the court. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:268 (1951); Onio Rav. CODE
ANN. § 2945A0 (Page 1954). In Alabama, it appears to be discretionary with the
trial court whether it will permit the expert to testify that he was appointed by the
court. Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 220, 225, 27 So. 2d 186, 189, 194 (1946).
37 See Glueck, Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime, 36 YALE
L.J. 632, 636 (1927); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U.
CHI. L. REv. 325, 330 (1955); Lefler, The Criminal Procedure Reforms of 1936-
Twenty Years After, 11 Apx. L. REv. 117, 125 (1957) ; Overholser, The Briggs Law
of Massachusetts: A Review and an Appraisal, 25 J. CatM. L., C. & P.S. 859, 874
(1935); Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases,
48 MicH. L. REv. 961, 967-68, 972 (1950); Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle
of Experts: Hospital Examination of Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 LAw &
CoNxTm. PROB. 419, 422 (1935). The system employed on the continent is similar
but it operates against the backdrop of an inquisitorial system, in which the trial
judge or magistrate has the primary responsibility for investigating the facts. When
he deems it necessary, he appoints experts from official lists or from medico-legal
institutes. Because of the supposed impartiality of the court's expert, his opinion is
usually decisive. See generally Harder, Forensic Psychiatry in Switzerland, 9 CLEv-
MAR. L. REv. 467 (1960); Ploscowe, The Expert Witness in Criminal Cases in
France, Germany and Italy, 2 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 504 (1935) ; Schroeder, Prob-
lems Faced by the Impartial Expert Witness in Court: The Continental View, 34
TEmp. L.Q. 378 (1961). Apparently, at least in the Scandinavian countries, if the
expert psychiatrist concludes that defendant was insane at the time of the crime, the
defendant will not be prosecuted. Communication from Professor Johs. Andenaes,
Institute of Criminology and Crim. Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway, Mar.
20, 1961.
38 See McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 156 (1st Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 928 (1951). This is substantiated by responses to our questionnaires indi-
cating that it is rare for the court-appointed expert to have to testify at a trial. If
he appears, there is seldom an opposing psychiatric witness. If there is one, he is
most likely to appear for the defense. And in virtually all cases in which the issue
was litigated, the fact finders agreed with the court-appointed wituess. Communi-
cations from Mark Brandler, Judge, Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal.; John M. Murphy,
Public Defender for New Haven County, New Haven, Conn.; Richard S. Kaplan,
Indiana State Bar Ass'n Medical Legal Comm., Gary, Ind.; Ralph Robinson, Psy-
chiatric Clinic, Crim. Ct., Cleveland, Ohio; Ralph E. Pryor, Judge, First Judicial
Cir., Wellsburg, W. Va., Feb. 3, 1962.
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ended when it made available an "impartial" expert; certainly, the
state should not have to subsidize "shopping" for a witness favorable
to the defense?9
Unfortunately, the impartial expert does not bring "truth" with
him. Indeed, the assumptions underlying that notion are remarkably
naive. It is assumed that there is a body of knowledge which the
partisan expert will not produce because he feels obligated to give
answers favoring his client, that if the financial relationship is re-
moved, there will then be a scientist able to describe the entire picture.
There is little basis for believing that the ethical state of the profession
is so low or psychiatrists' income so inadequate as to warrant attach-
ing additional weight to a psychiatrist's testimony merely because he
is not in the pay of one of the parties. Even the more sophisticated
justification-that a court-appointed expert's judgment would not be
clouded by identification with one of two adversaries-is not per-
suasive. The testimony of all witnesses is subject to the very same
process of distortion. It hardly seems reasonable to insulate from the
adversary process the psychiatrist, who is perhaps the one among them
who has been trained to minimize the effect of identification upon his
perception and judgment.4
An impartial expert could be justified only if there was consensus
among psychiatrists on the answers to questions likely to arise in the
courtroom, on the qualifications of persons competent to present such
answers, and on the techniques to be used at the various stages of exam-
ination. No such consensus can be said to exist 1
First, with respect to qualifications, the court-appointed expert is
usually a government psychiatrist. He works in a mental hospital
or a health department. He is, therefore, less likely than those
in private practice to have a psychoanalytic orientation,4" with
all that implies for finding no mental disease in persons charged with
crime.4 3  Moreover, he may not even be a qualified psychiatrist. Un-
39 See McGarty v. O'Brien, supra note 38, at 157. Compare United States v.
Hines, 148 F. Supp. 73, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), rev/d on other grounds, 256 F.2d 561
(2d Cir. 1958), in which the court refused to appoint a handwriting expert at public
expense, pointing out that if one had already examined the specimen and formed
an opinion, he would be subject to an ordinary subpoena and, if not, defendant was
merely speculating as to what the expert testimony would be; he should not be able
to do so at government expense.
40 See Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, ARcH. CRim. Ps cHoDYN.
221 (1959). See also Zeisel, The New York Expert Testimny Project: Some
Reflections oan Legal Experiments, 8 STAN. L. REv. 730, 738 (1956).
4 1 An earlier statement on the subject is to be found in an Address by Abraham
S. Goldstein, "The Psychiatrist and the Legal Process: The Proposals for Impartial
Experts and for Preventive Detention," American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n, March 24,
1961.
42 Diamond, supra note 40, at 221, 228.
43 See Guttmacher, supra note 37, at 328.
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der many statutes, the court is free to choose any physician, without
regard to whether he has had special training or experience in psychi-
atry." And there is a great deal of pressure upon him to do so.
There is a great shortage of psychiatrists; even mental hospitals face
severe personnel shortages which require them to hire psychiatrists
who are either lacking in experience or who are not certified by the
appropriate professional board.45 It is certainly an overstatement to
say, as did Professor Weihofen in an early flush of enthusiasm, that
a system of court appointment is "almost 100% foolproof.""
Second, with respect to disagreement among psychiatrists, under-
lying the so-called "battle of experts" is not the lure of gold or "identi-
fication" with patients but rather "identification" with work ways,
value systems, and differing schools of psychiatry4 The organically
oriented psychiatrist will often find himself reading the patient's history
and symptoms differently from the dynamically oriented psychiatrist.
The history each will elicit from the accused, his family, and his friends
will differ. The potential for disagreement is magnified in the trial
of the insanity defense because the defendant will almost always be a
borderline case 8 The jury must determine long after the offense
4 4 In West Virginia he need only be a "physician," in Michigan a "reputable
physician" and in Louisiana, a "disinterested physician," who is defined as one who
"shall have been duly licensed in this state or another state and shall have been
graduated from a legally chartered medical school or college and shall have been in
the actual practice of medicine for three years since graduation and for three years
last preceding the acceptance of appointment for examination." LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:269 (1951). Moreover, the coroner, who is not a psychiatrist, must, if possible,
be one of the examining physicians. Ibid. In one case in which the coroner testified
as to defendant's mental condition, he used the term "epileptic personality," which,
despite repeated questioning, he was unable to define. See State v. Sauls, 226 La.
694, 707, 77 So. 2d 8, 12 (1954). Michigan's sex offender statute, MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§28.967(4) (1954), is exceptional in its definition of qualifications. Each of the
three examining psychiatrists must have at least five years experience in the exclusive
practice of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment and be chosen from a list of not less
than six compiled by the Department of Mental Health. In West Virginia "it is
not uncommon for a medical doctor to be appointed with a psychiatrist to make the
examination and report to the Court. . . . In the three counties in which I preside
• . . only Ohio County has psychiatrists or neurologists." Communication from
Ralph E. Pryor, Judge, First Judicial Cir., Wellsburg, W. Va., Feb. 3, 1962.
45 See ALBEE, MENTAL HEALTH MANPOWER TRENDS 228, Table 18 (1959).
Public hospitals are such busy places, it is unlikely that the average patient is seen
for more than a few hours by a ward physician. Diamond, supra note 40, at 231.
Of the seven questionnaire responses received reporting that present state hospital
facilities were inadequate to perform the tasks assigned them by statute, four attributed
this primarily to inadequate staff. Communications from Granville L. Jones, M.D.,
Arkansas State Hosp., Little Rock, Ark.; Emile Grunberg, M.D., Massachusetts
Correctional Institution, East Bridgewater, Mass.; Superintendent, Vermont State
Hosp., Waterbury, Vt.; Theodore G. Denton, M.D., Central State Hosp., Peters-
burg, Va.
46Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Cases in Colorado, 9 RocK MvT.
L. Rxv. 213, 215 (1937).
47 See the references in note 12 supra.
48Those who are seriously disturbed are likely to be committed, before trial
and by agreement, to a mental institution either because they are not competent to
stand trial or because they are civilly committable.
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whether such a "borderline" defendant was responsive to the sanctions
of the legal order at the time of the offense and yet chose to ignore
them. As part of this decision, the jury may have to conclude that
a psychotic who is often rational was not rational on a given date, and
that the act in question can properly be traced to his illness. In so
doing, an appraisal must be made of the methods used by the expert to
arrive at his judgments, the kinds of evidence upon which he relied,
the techniques he used to elicit it and to test its accuracy. If the
expert is at all candid, he will concede that his testimony represents
a series of estimates drawn from various clues-some from the patient's
life history, some from his performances in clinical tests, some from
the nature of the situation in which he found himself on the occasion
in question.
Any and all of these factors may remain unknown to the jury if de-
fense counsel is unable to elicit them on cross-examination or to present
his own version-both of which require that a psychiatrist be available
to the accused. The jury may never learn that what is psychotic to one
expert may be neurotic to another, that what some call psychopathy
may be interpreted by others as a failure of communication between
a Class I psychiatrist and a Class V offender 9 Indeed, differences
among the examining physicians may not even be brought to the at-
tention of the court. Reports from most state hospitals usually contain
briefly stated conclusions, and they almost never indicate the minority
views held by some members of the staff.5"
It may be suggested that there is no need to scrap the impartial
expert in order to insure that disagreements will be aired. For ex-
ample, why not simply build disagreement into a board of experts?
Indeed, why not authorize the defendant to name one of the psychi-
49 The terminology is drawn from HOLLINGSHEAD & REDLICa, SOCIAL CLASS
AND MENTAL ILLNEss 66-135 (1958).
50 Of 17 responses to a questionnaire on the subject to superintendents of state
hospitals, 13 indicated that minority views, which may exist, are never recorded in the
report. Communications from J. S. Tarwater, M.D., Alabama State Hosp., Tusca-
loosa, Ala.; Granville L. Jones, M.D., Arkansas State Hosp., Little Rock, Ark.;
D. A. Pooler, M.D., Bangor State Hosp., Bangor, Me.; Emile Grunberg, M.D.,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution, East Bridgewater, Mass.; John L. Smalldon,
M.D., New Hampshire State Hosp., Concord, N.H.; Prison Ward, Bellevue Psy-
chiatric Hosp., New York, N.Y.; H. S. Barahal, M.D., Pilgrim State Hosp., West
Brentwood, N.Y.; Walter A. Sikes, M.D., Dorothea Dix Hosp., Raleigh, N.C.;
J. 0. Crist, M.D., Lima State Hosp., Lima, Ohio; William S. Hall, M.D., South
Carolina State Hosp., Columbia, S.C.; Superintendent, Vermont State Hosp., Water-
bury, Vt.; Theodore G. Denton, M.D., Central State Hosp., Petersburg, Va.; William
N. Karn, Jr., M.D., Wyoming State Hosp., Evanston, Wyo. Only in Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia, is this done, and even there,
extremely rarely. Communications from W. P. Camp, Norristown State Hosp.,
Norristown, Pa.; Bruno Radaukas, M.D., Spring Grove State Hosp., Baltimore,
Md.; James A. Taylor, M.D., Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Psychiatry, Western Tennessee
Medical School; James A. Ryan, M.D., District of Columbia General Hosp., Wash-
ington, D.C., March 8, 1962.
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atrists to serve on such a board? This already occurs in several
states. In Ohio, the defendant is examined by two government psychi-
atrists employed by a court clinic, but he may have a psychiatrist of his
choice appointed to the examining commission.51 In Connecticut,
judges appoint an examining board made up of two or three psychi-
atrists and often choose them upon recommendations from the state's
attorney and defense counsel.52 Arguably, such a procedure gives the
defendant all the benefits he could receive from appointment of the
witness as his own, except that the expert he designates may not sup-
port his defense. Obviously, he should not be entitled to have experts
appointed at government expense until one takes the position he
wants.5 3  The board does present certain problems. If it consists of
nominees of the prosecution, the defense, and the court, it is likely to
repeat the problem already posed by a "court" expert. If there are
only two members, one for the prosecution and one for the defense,
controversy will continue in the borderline cases. In short, such a
proposal would simply build into the expert board the very issues
which are presently aired in the so-called "battle of experts." And
because the board would examine and deliberate together and perhaps
even file a joint report, it is likely that such genuine disagreement
would be muted. The very issues and normative problems calling most
for decision by a jury would have been screened out.
In sum, the "impartial" expert may be more or less qualified,
more or less oriented so as to be predisposed for or against the accused.
It is not a matter of bias of a government psychiatrist for the govern-
ment's case.' Government has become too pluralistic to charge bias
to all who work for it. Few would argue, for example, that a pro-
government bias is inevitable in judges, probation workers, assigned
counsel and public defenders. The issue is entirely different. It can
be understood only against the backdrop of an adversary system. In
such a system, knowledge is presumed to be finite. Only a limited
category of incontrovertibles-that of judicial notice--exists. The
"impartial expert" intrudes upon the model of the ineluctably fallible
man since his is the only expert testimony the state is obligated to
provide. If his testimony supports the state's position, as is likely to
51 Communication from Ralph Robinson, Psychiatric Clinic, Crim. Ct., Cleveland,
Ohio. This occurred in five or six of the 115 cases referred to the clinic during 1959
and 1960. Such experts were paid fees ranging from $100 to $250.
5 2 Communication from John M. Murphy, Public Defender for New Haven
County, New Haven, Conn.
53 See note 38 sulpra and accompanying text.
5 4 Arguably there may be added pressure on the government psychiatrist to find
defendant sane because he is the person who will probably have to deal with the
accused should the jury find him not guilty on grounds of insanity.
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be the case, the accused will have no resources available to make the
kind of corrections the adversary process assumes he is able to make.
He will then have to rely on the conventional methods of impeaching
experts-by challenging, for example, their professional standing, their
competence, the thoroughness of their examination, and their impar-
tiality.5 Of course, as lawyers become more knowledgeable in this
field, even the "impartial" expert and his findings will be subjected to
closer scrutiny than has heretofore been the case. But this will hardly
suffice to provide the indigent accused with the "adequate defense"
which only his own expert can assure.
B. The General Subpoena Power
In the ten states which have no specialized procedure,5" as in all
other states, counsel may call upon the persons who have dealt with
the accused in the course of what is often an extensive psychiatric
history. The accused may have been involved with school authorities,
clinics, family service agencies, mental hospitals, and juvenile au-
thorities, leaving behind him reports of psychiatrists, neurologists,
clinical psychologists, and social workers. The authors of such reports
are valuable fact witnesses who need be paid no more than a nominal
witness fee. In the case of the indigent, even that fee will often be
paid by the state.57
When subpoenaed, these experts may be required to testify to the
details of their relationship with the defendant, their test findings, their
diagnoses, and the like. 8 This testimony may, without more, persuade
judge or jury to infer from the prior history that the accused was
insane at the time of the crime. There will, however, be cases in which
the time gap between the past condition and the crime is so great that
a jury could not properly infer that the condition persisted. It may
55 See United States ex rel, Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 547 (3d Cir. 1951),
aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953). McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 157 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951). It was argued recently in the District of Columbia
that a defendant is entitled to a "meaningful mental examination." Such an exami-
nation, it was urged, cannot be obtained from a government psychiatrist. The reasons
suggested were: (1) defendant will inevitably be less than candid when he speaks to
a government psychiatrist, particularly if he knows that his disclosures may be intro-
duced into evidence against him, even if only on his mental condition; (2) since de-
fendant's interests are most apt to be served by dynamically-oriented psychiatrists
who are relatively rare in government service, judicial discretion should be exercised
to permit a defendant to select his own psychiatrist. Brief for Defendant, p. 15,
United States v. Flint, Misc. No. 1387, D.C. Cir., Dec. 3, 1959. Both contentions
were rejected without comment. Order, United States v. Flint, supra.
56 Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico,
New Jersey, and Washington.
57 See note 73 infra.
58 See cases collected in Annot, Compelling Expert to Testify, 77 A.L.R.2d 1182,
1186 n.12 (1961).
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then be necessary to show through expert testimony that the prior con-
dition was such that it would ordinarily have persisted up to the time
of the crime; or that the past condition, though not in itself sufficiently
serious, was such that it would deteriorate by the time of the crime.
If the information sought may be supplied by a testifying psychiatrist
without special preparation, based on a spot application of his ex-
pertise to facts known to him by virtue of his prior relationship with
the accused, then the court will generally compel it.59 A slight exten-
sion of this approach would be to put the missing facts in evidence
through other witnesses and then present them to the expert as part
of a hypothetical question. There is some authority for requiring the
expert who is also a fact witness to state an opinion upon facts pre-
sented to him in this manner.' For psychiatrists already involved in
the life of the defendant, the time required to serve such limited addi-
tional functions is hardly an undue burden.
A separate question arises when the witness sought by the de-
fendant is a psychiatrist who has had no prior contact with the de-
fendant, or whose prior contact does not lend itself to current use on
the witness stand. The cases unanimously hold that such an expert
will not be required to prepare himself to testify through examinations,
tests, or research.61 In this instance, the interest in obtaining informa-
tion for the trial process gives way completely to the interest in paying
people for their labor.
Between the extremes of the psychiatrist as fact witness and the
psychiatrist as performer of substantial labors, there may be a middle
ground. The psychiatrist new to the case could have information re-
garding defendant's mental condition supplied by a hypothetical, ques-
tion; or he might be able to testify regarding psychiatric matters with-
out relating them specifically to the accused, leaving the task of appli-
59 The view generally stated is "that an expert may be compelled, without extra
compensation, to give his opinion as to the matter in question, or to state an opinion
already formed and existing, or which is based on facts or conditions previously ob-
served or upon an examination or investigation previously made, or which does not
require any special study or investigation." Id. at 1187-88. Though the annotation
does not label this position as "the most widely held view," we do so advisedly,
drawing from the cases upon which the annotation is based.
601d. at 1188 n.3; State v. Bell, 212 Mo. 111, 126-27, 111 S.W. 24, 28 (1908);
Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 215, 120 N.W. 829, 830-31 (1909): "[I]f
from the witness's observation or from the hypothetical facts stated to him he has
consciously in mind either knowledge or an opinion, such knowledge or existent
opinion is a fact as to which he may be required to testify; but, as is often the case,
and in the higher branches of expert learning perhaps usually, an amount of study,
experimentation, thought, and reflection may be necessary to the formation of an
opinion, and the witness may often honestly answer that he has not formed such
opinion . . . ." See also Barnes v. Boatmen's Natl Bank, 348 Mo. 1032, 1038, 156
S.W.2d 597, 600-01 (1941); Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo. App. 683, 690, 103 S.W.
121, 122 (1907).
61 See note 59 supra.
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cation to judge and jury; or he might be asked to attend the proceed-
ings, listen to the evidence, and render an opinion on the basis of
observations in court. This poses the question of whether case law
might be expanded to bring such limited uses of a psychiatrist under
the general subpoena power. It may be argued that the psychiatrist
who had "witnessed" the materials in his field of expertise should be
as much subject to process as those who have witnessed "facts" at
some time in the past. 2
There are a few cases which hold that the expert who is not a
fact witness must answer hypothetical questions put to him on the
witness stand." But the more usual position rejects the use of process
against the psychiatrist who is not a fact witness. Such a person, the
argument runs, is merely one of a large class who might aid the court's
inquiry, and therefore his public duty is of a lesser order than that of
the expert who is also a fact witness, or of fact witnesses generally.
The argument is not persuasive. If a witness was needed to testify to
the weather at a particular time and place, he could hardly resist sub-
poena merely because he was a member of a large class. The same is
true of persons testifying to another's reputation, or of an eyewitness
who may have been only one of a large number who observed the event.
The real basis for the distinction is the reluctance to impose a sub-
stantial burden on a limited class of persons, particularly when services
are involved for which substantial payment is traditionally made.
Yet there are two situations in which persons are required to
make comparable sacrifices in furtherance of the administration of
justice. First, in most states, lawyers may be assigned to represent
indigent defendants-usually without fee, except in capital cases. They
must devote considerable time in preparing and presenting the case.
Payment for investigators, secretaries, and other incidental expenses
will probably have to come from their own pockets.' Although the
constitutionality of such procedures has been challenged on the ground
that the legislature lacks the power "to say to the physician, the
6 2 In addition to the cases cited in note 60 spira, see Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919), describing the duty to testify in court or before a grand
jury as one "which every person within the jurisdiction . . .is bound to perform
upon being properly sunmoned, and for performance of which he is entitled to no
further compensation than that which the statutes provide. The personal sacrifice
involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of
the public. . . . [T]he witness is bound not only to attend but to tell what he knows
in answer to questions framed for the purpose of bringing out the truth of the matter
under inquiry."
63 See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Lee, 3 Colo. App. 177, 179, 32 Pac. 841, 842
(1893) ; Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 191, 48 N.E. 108, 110-11 (1897).
64 The New York cases are reviewed in People v. Marx, 10 Misc. 2d 1053, 168
N.Y.S2d 562 (Queens County Ct. 1957).
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surgeon, the lawyer, the farmer, or anyone else, that he shall render
this or that service, or perform this or that act in the line of his pro-
fession or business, without remuneration," 65 the courts have gener-
ally upheld them. 66 The attorney's status as an officer of the court has
been said to impose upon him the obligation to aid the court, or he
has been said to share in a general obligation to assist in the adminis-
tration of justice.67 Second, citizens are everywhere required to per-
form jury duty with little or no compensation. Such service requires
not only thought and concentration for sustained periods, but, for
many, it entails considerable loss of earnings. Yet the Supreme Court
has described jury service as a duty of citizenship which "cannot be
shirked on a plea of inconvenience or decreased earning power." 68
These analogies suggest that the state's interest in resolving dis-
putes may require that certain groups-particularly those possessed
of specially useful information--donate their time to the administra-
tion of justice. From this, one might assume that the indigent ac-
cused could obtain psychiatric assistance through an expansion of the
general subpoena power. Yet there is an obvious distinction between
lawyers and jurors on the one hand and psychiatrists on the other.
It can be more readily said that lawyers bear a special responsibility
for the administration of justice. And jurors are drawn from so large
a group that burdens can be distributed equitably. Psychiatrists
satisfy neither criterion. Moreover, statistics suggest the undesir-
ability of using psychiatrists as such a group. 69 There are only 8,912
practicing psychiatrists in the United States--one for every 18,800
people--, and they are distributed very unevenly. Further, dynam-
ically oriented psychiatrists, who might well be the experts of choice
for the accused, are far fewer in number and are more heavily con-
centrated in major urban areas. There are just not enough psychi-
atrists to support the luxury of a free market approach to the problem.
Five cities alone--New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, and
Washington-account for 63%o of the total number of psychoanalysts.
Even in the urban centers where the supply might meet the demand,
too many defendants might summon the services of too few psychi-
atrists. Though this problem might be solved administratively-for
65 County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585, 588-89 (1861).
66 E.g., Presby v. Klicldtat County, 5 Wash. 329, 332, 31 Pac. 876, 877 (1892).
6 People ex rel. Whedon v. Board of Supervisors, 192 App. Div. 705, 183 N.Y.
Supp. 438 (1920); People v. Marx, 10 Misc. 2d 1053, 1057, 168 N.Y.S.2d 562, 566
(Queens County Ct. 1957) ; Presby v. Klickitat County, mspra note 66, at 332, 31 Pac.
at 877.
08 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946).
69See ALBEr, MENTAL HEALTH MxrovEA TRENDS 59, tables 28-30, 32, 37, 48
(1959).
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example, by creating panels to distribute the burden-the resulting
system would still not be one of choice. Economic considerations apart,
the psychiatrist so summoned is likely to be both hostile and grudging
of his time. Indeed, this is so potent a factor that it has deprived of
any force the two or three statutes which seem to require the expert
to testify even when he has no personal knowledge of the case."°
Clearly, the indigent accused supplied only with counsel and rely-
ing solely upon the general subpoena power is not in a position to
present an "adequate" insanity defense. Only if he has a substantial
psychiatric history in the jurisdiction in which he is tried is he likely
to be able to present psychiatric testimony. Even then, he may en-
counter problems in bringing the history up to date or in eliciting more
generalized opinions. Moreover, he cannot expect any substantial
commitment of time from a psychiatrist in performing the mutual
orientation functions which we suggest are so important. Though
some zealous psychiatrists donating their time to some defendants may
enable those defendants to achieve "adequate" defense, the law does
nothing to assure a satisfactory minimal standard. The impenetrable
barrier is the right of the expert to be paid for his services-a right
which the courts will probably continue to recognize.
C. Subsidizing the Defense
Courts have generally refused to hold, in the absence of a statute
authorizing it, that defense experts should be paid by the state.71  The
approach has been a passive one which leaves the parties as before-
mismatched. There have been rare occasions, however, when courts
have asserted an inherent power to appoint a psychiatrist for the ac-
cused and have him paid by the state.72 But the dominant view re-
7 0 AA. CODE, tit. 7, § 366 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1722 (Supp. 1962); cf.
MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 25-414 (1947). These statutes do not necessarily require
testimony from the expert who has no personal knowledge but they can be so con-
strued. This construction is suggested by the history of the Indiana statute. See
Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877) ; Dills v. State, 59 Ind. 15, 24 (1877) (dissenting
opinion). The statute, which was enacted four years after these cases, has produced
no reported litigation and Indiana counsel consulted by us say they know of no instance
in which it has been used to obtain psychiatric aid for the indigent defendant. Com-
munications from Cleon H. Foust, Professor, Indiana Univ. School of Law; Charles
W. Symmes, Att'y, Indianapolis, Ind. For some years, there has been an alternative
procedure-appointment of experts by the court-under IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1702
(1956). Its existence may account in part for the paucity of case law under the
earlier statute.
71 See State v. Weeks, 78 N.H. 408, 409, 101 Atl. 35, 36 (1917) ; Commonwealth
v. Green, 346 Pa. 172, 175, 29 A.2d 491, 493 (1943); Philler v. Waukesha County,
139 Wis. 211, 217, 120 N.W. 829, 831 (1909).
7 2 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 105-06, 71 A.2d
107, 113, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 812 (1950). During the hearing on a habeas corpus
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mains one which denies the judge the power to tax the public with the
cost of assuring that available defenses are adequately made. There
are, however, a number of statutory patterns which either deal ex-
plicitly with the problem or which may be used in an attempt to meet
the need. Most common are the statutes which provide for state com-
pensation of witnesses called by an indigent accused.73  These are
ordinarily invoked by the filing of an affidavit alleging the necessity
for such testimony.' Though some were presumably intended to au-
thorize only payments of an ordinary witness fee,7" the great majority
refer merely to "witnesses," leaving for decision whether expert wit-
nesses may be paid expert fees.7"
Unfortunately, there is virtually no case law on the question.
Only two appellate cases have been found, neither of which is precisely
on point. Both indicate that "expert" fees are not contemplated. One
petition, the trial judge testified that if a psychiatrist had been "asked for" by the
indigent defendant's counsel, one would have been appointed, although there was no
provision in the Pennsylvania statutes for the state to furnish such assistance. Some
of the answers to questionnaires indicate that "inherent power" may be invoked more
frequently than is usually assumed and that psychiatric assistance is furnished without
regard to the statutes. Communications from Jacob A. Latona, County Judge, Erie
County Ct, Buffalo, N.Y.; Aram A. Arabian, Att'y, Providence, R.I. Nor is re-
liance on "inherent power" without precedent in a closely related area. In Wisconsin,
for example, the courts are said to have power, apart from statute-and even in the
face of a statute to the contrary-to order payment of counsel for an indigent accused
out of public funds. Such compensation is said to be "proper and just," for the state
is "vitally more interested in saving an innocent man from unmerited punishment
than in the conviction of a guilty one." Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274,
276-77 (1859) ; County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585, 588 (1861).
73 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-7-32 (1953); DEL. SuPER. CT. CRrm. R. 17(b);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 932.36-.37 (1944); HWvAn REv. LAws § 222-11 (1955); MICE.
STAT. ANN. § 28.1252 (1954) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 357.32 (1957) ; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-1903 (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-19 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 604:1-2 (1955); OxiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 718 (1937); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 12-17-8 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 21-5-14 (1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.10
(1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §7-245 (1957). See also D.C. CODE ANN. §23-109
(1961); FED. R. ClM. P. 17(b). In several other states provision exists for pay-
ment of defense witnesses whether or not defendant is indigent. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1329; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-153 (1958) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 781.2 (1950) ;
MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 277, § 66 (1956) (limited to capital and life-imprisonment
cases); NEv. REv. STAT. § 48.300 (1961); N.Y. CODE CRm. PROC. § 617; S.D. CODE
§ 36.0401 (Supp. 1960); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1036 (1950).
74 In Rhode Island the affidavit need refer only to defendant's inability to procure
his own witnesses. In Delaware a motion or request from defendant is all that is
required. In a few states, for example, Minnesota and Nebraska, if the defendant
proves unable to pay his witnesses after trial, the county will do so. Statutes cited
note 73 supra. Where the procedure is for the defendant to make a request before
trial, decision is within the court's discretion. Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S.
70, 73 (1895) ; Murdock v. United States, 283 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 953 (1961); Dupuis v. United States, 5 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1925).
75In California, Nevada, South Dakota, and Texas, the provision for state
compensation of defense witnesses appears either in the same section as, or the one
following, the section setting the ordinary witness fees. Statutes cited note 73 stpra.
7 6 Along with the provision authorizing payment of witness fees for the indigent,
a few states have another one authorizing the court to set reasonable fees for expert
witnesses. DEn.. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8906 (1953) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.918 (1935) ;
MINN. STAT. ANN. §357.25 (1957). In these states a construction applying the
witness statutes to expert fees seems more likely than where there is no judicial
control over fees.
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involved a request for the appointment of a second psychiatrist to
appear for the-defendant at public expense." The trial judge rejected
the request, and his action was upheld on appeal. The appellate court
pointed out that one expert witness had already been paid by the
state and suggested that such payment had been improper. "[T]he
defendants were not entitled to have an expert witness summoned at
an expense to the public greater than the statutory witness fee and
mileage. There is no statute providing for fees of medical witnesses
or alienists in excess of those allowed non-expert witnesses." 7 The
other case 79 arose out of a request for state payment of a psychiatrist
to examine the defendant before trial. The request was denied, the
court holding that the statute did not cover the costs of preparing for
trial.8" These statutory constructions, albeit narrow, are consistent
with a preexisting case law treating fees for the indigent's witnesses as
a matter of grace and holding generally that there is no right to the
appointment of expert witnesses at public expense. Nevertheless, those
who drew these statutes were unquestionably aware of the existence of
the two classes of witnesses. Their failure to distinguish between the
classes or to limit the courts' power to approve witness fees beyond
the ordinary supports a broader view.
Whatever the legislators intended, they wrote their statutes
broadly, and most trial judges seem to have. so construed them. In
order to ascertain the practice under these statutes, we wrote to the
trial court clerks in the largest cities in ten states having such legis-
lation.8' Eight responded. Seven said that these statutes are con-
strued to authorize the payment of more than the ordinary witness fee
to experts."' One said that such fees were authorized only if the "state
jointly uses" the expert.83 None had an accurate count of the number
of times the statute had been invoked for this purpose.8
77 Osborn v. People, 83 Colo. 4, 11, 262 Pac. 892, 895 (1927).
78 Ibid.
79 State v. Weeks, 78 N.H. 408, 101 Atl. 35 (1917).
80 d. at 409, 101 Atl. at 36; see Henry G. Clark, 104 Mass. 537 (1870).
81 Dist. Ct., Denver, Colo.; Super. Ct., New Haven, Conn.; Cir. Ct., Jacksonville,
Fla.; Cir. Ct., Honolulu, Hawaii; Super. Ct., Concord, N.H.; Dist. Ct., Bismarck,
N.D.; Dist. Ct., Oklahoma City, Okla.; Dist. Ct., Salt Lake City, Utah; Cir. Ct.,
Milwaukee, Wis.; Dist. Ct., Cheyenne, Wyo.82 Communications from John M. Murphy, Public Defender for New Haven
County, New Haven, Conn.; Bill M. Davis, Ass't Clerk, Cir. Ct., Jacksonville, Fla.;
Kenneth C. Amona, Court Fiscal Officer, Honolulu, Hawaii; Henry P. Callahan,
Clerk, Super. Ct., Concord, N.H.; Dale Smith, Court Clerk, Oklahoma City, Okla.;
Harry J. Zdrojek, Clerk of Munic. and Dist. Cts., Milwaukee, Wis.; Barney Cole,
County Att'y, Cheyenne, Wyo. In Connecticut, the statute is not ordinarily used be-
cause the Public Defender system has made it obsolete. Communication from John M.
Murphy, mtpra.
83 Communication from Joseph G. Jeppson, Dist. Judge, Salt Lake City, Utah.
84 Where estimates were made, they ranged from three authorizations in several
years in Milwaukee, Wis., to four a year in Concord, N.H. The fees authorized also
varied greatly, ranging from $50 per day to $500 maximum for all services rendered.
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Statutes in a few states authorize the judge to fix fees for experts
which will compensate them reasonably for their time."' They say
nothing as to whether the state will pay the fee if the defendant is un-
able to, but they do protect him against the possibility of being charged
an unreasonably high fee. Iowa has gone even further by legislating
a fixed fee for experts,86 but inflation has made the statute obsolete.
Only a handful of states have statutes explicitly directed to the
problem of state payment for expert aid. Their objective is to deal
with "what is a matter of common knowledge, that upon the trial of
certain issues, such as insanity or forgery, experts are often necessary
both for prosecution and for defense. . . . [A] defendant may be at
an unfair disadvantage if he is unable because of poverty to parry by
his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him." " Rhode Island
has a statute providing that "In criminal cases in the discretion of the
court, on request of the defendant, expert witnesses may be furnished
for the defendant at the expense of the state, on such terms and con-
ditions as may be prescribed by the court." 88 It is apparently the
practice in that state for the court, on motion, to appoint a psychiatrist
selected by the state and to pay him $100 for the examination and
$100 for each day of testimony. 9  California has a statute and a prac-
tice similar to Rhode Island. ° New York is much more restrictive; 91
its statute is applicable only to capital cases and limits both the number
of experts the accused may use and the amount which may be expended.
No more than $1,000 is made available. Under this statute, defense
85 Statutes cited note 76 mipra.
86The fee is fixed at $4 per day, which is somewhat higher than the ordinary
witness fee. IowA CODE ANx. § 622.72 (1950). According to Professor Samuel M.
Fahr of the University of Iowa Law School, "[T]his section of the Code has fallen
into complete disuse. Fallen may be a misnomer . . . because it never has been
used freely. . . . [I]n a very few instances it has been used to compensate-if that
word is appropriate-psychiatrists who have voluntarily testified for indigent persons.
So far as I know it has never been used to require testimony." Communication from
Professor Fahr, Dec. 21, 1961.
87 Reilly v. Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J.).
88 ILL GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-17-19 (1956).
89What is not clear is whether this practice, which is reported by a former
public defender, occurs under this statute, under an inherent power of the court, or
as part of the general public defender apparatus. Communication from Aram A.
Arabian, Att'y, Providence, RI.
90 CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1871; cf. People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 780, 291 P.2d
469, 471 (1955); People v. Rickson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 475, 479, 246 P.2d 700, 703
(Dist. Ct. App. 1952); People v. Spraic, 87 Cal. App. 724, 727, 262 Pac. 795, 797
(Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
91N.Y. CODE CRrM. PROC. § 308; see People v. Marx, 10 Misc. 2d 1053, 1054-55,
168 N.Y.S.2d 562, 564 (Queens County Ct. 1957); People v. Fernandez, 202 Misc.
190, 194-95, 109 N.Y.S.2d 561, 565 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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counsel is ordinarily permitted to choose his own psychiatrist. 2 The
compensation paid the expert will vary. 3
In a few states, provisions for reimbursement of assigned counsel
for reasonable expenses incurred in the course of conducting the de-
fense ' are sometimes construed broadly enough to authorize reim-
bursement for funds spent on experts. Such an interpretation of the
Massachusetts statute, limited to capital cases, is made clear by the
existence of a court rule setting forth conditions for the authorization.95
Under it, requests by defense counsel for the appointment of a psychi-
atrist have been routinely granted."
All of these statutory schemes represent an attempt to work within
and to subsidize the adversary process. Where they exist, they are an
important and useful resource. But they are, for the most part, not
adequate to the need. They leave unsettled the kinds of services which
the defense may obtain from a psychiatrist and the extent to which
other specialists may be used; they make expert aid a matter for the
court's rather than counsel's discretion; and they leave court deter-
mination of the expert's fees on a case-by-case basis. In short, they
involve the court entirely too much in what should properly be defense
counsel's sphere, making him justify in advance his feeling that he
would like to pursue certain avenues of cross-examination or defense."
Moreover, the public subsidy approach tends to make an expert
available to counsel unqualified to use him. The assigned-counsel
system, which still dominates the American scene, ordinarily "pits
against prosecutor and police an inexperienced defense counsel-ill
versed in the techniques of trial of criminal cases, possessed of no
investigative assistance and motivated only by his sense of injustice
and professional responsibility." 98
The "adequate defense" of which we have spoken is likely to be
provided only by counsel experienced in the trial of criminal cases.
92 Communications from Abraham N. Geller, Judge, Ct. Gen. Sess., New York
County, N.Y., Dec. 6, 1961; Jacob A. Latona, Judge, Erie County Ct., Buffalo, N.Y.
93 In Buffalo, it ranges from $25 to $50 for an examination with additional
amounts for each day of testimony. Ibid.
94 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 987a; IN'D. ANN. STAT. § 13-1404 (1956); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 56 (1956) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 604:3 (Supp. 1961) ; N.Y.
CODE CRI. PROC. § 308; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 784 (Supp. 1961).
15 MASS. Supz . CT. R. 96 provides, "[T]he court will not allow compensation
for services of an expert or expert witness for the defense in a capital case unless
an order of the court or a justice naming such expert or expert witness and authorizing
his employment was made before he was employed."
96 See McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 157 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928
(1951) (dictum).
9 7 Cf. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
98 Goldstein, Book Review, 28 U. CHr. L. Rnv. 772 (1961).
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If the criminal law bar were sufficiently large, and if assignments of
counsel were made from their ranks alone, it might well make sense
to develop for the use of assigned counsel a system of public subsidy
for investigation and expert assistance. Possibly one can justify mak-
ing such resources available to assigned counsel generally in the hope
that he will learn how to use them. But the question would still remain
whether it would not be preferable to put the state's resources into a
professionalized defender system. According to a recent report, a
system of paid, assigned counsel would not only cost a good deal more,
it could never hope to develop the special knowledge and competence
which can be expected from an office exclusively concerned with the
defense of the indigent accused." Such a professionalized facility al-
ready exists in many places in the form of a public defender or a private
legal aid society.'00 When they are staffed by lawyers who give them
a substantial portion of their work-week, they begin to compare favor-
ably with the prosecutor's office. To become genuinely comparable,
however, they would need the extralegal assistance-for example, in-
vestigators and experts-the state commits to the prosecution of crime.
Unfortunately, very few defense agencies have funds adequate for such
purposes. If more than the lawyer's services are needed, he must in-
voke the procedures generally available to the indigent accused. Al-
though the courts may be more generous in applying these procedures
to a defender agency than to assigned counsel, 1' the underlying prob-
lems remain. Permission to hire an expert or investigator must be
obtained from the court through a showing of special need; the sums
requested may be pared down; counsel is not free to secure assistance
at the time of need.
In a handful of defender offices, usually located in large cities, the
appropriation is large enough to meet some of these problems. In-
stead of the petition to the court for subsidy on a case-by-case basis,
funds are provided to the defender on an annual basis. From these,
9 9 SPEcIAL CommiTTEE TO STUDY DEFENDER SYSTEmS, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE
AccusED 64, 81 (1959).
10OAs to public defenders, see e.g., CA. GOV'T CODE §§ 27700-11; CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. §§54-80-81 (Supp. 1961); D.C. CODE ANN. §§2-2201 (1961); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 34, §§ 5601-09 (Snith-Hurd Supp. 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 13-1401-06
(1956) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611.12-.13 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1804-05
(1956) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 138.1-.6 (Supp. 1961) ; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§§ 12-15-1-7 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.1-12-13 (Supp. 1960). Public defender
offices exist, pursuant to local ordinance, in St. Louis, Mo., Columbus, Ohio, and
Shelby County, Tenn. See SPECIAL CoMmiTTEE TO STUDY DEFENDER SYSTEMS, op.
cit. siupra note 99, at 144. Private defender organizations or legal aid societies exist
in a considerable number of cities-e.g., New York, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia.
Id. at 50-51.
101 See communications from John M. Murphy, Public Defender for New Haven
County, New Haven, Conn.; Aram A. Arabian, former Public Defender, Provi-
dence, RI.
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he may retain such investigative or expert assistance as he needs.
02
This approach envisions a defense office independent of the court and
as free to control its operations as the office of the prosecution.
III. ASSURING EQUALITY IN THE CONDITIONS OF LITIGATION
Our survey of existing patterns of psychiatric assistance has found
virtually all of them inadequate. It remains to be seen whether courts
will play a dominant role in compelling changes or whether statutory
reform will prevail. There is evidence which indicates that both fronts
will be active in the near future. Bar associations have addressed
themselves increasingly in recent years to assuring "equal justice for
the accused." 103 The federal government, the Ford Foundation, and
others are working on the problem.' Improvement should follow as
the bar and the public learn the shocking extent to which equal justice
has been denied.
Meanwhile, pressures from courts are increasing. Passive for so
long in shaping the conditions of litigation, the courts, under the leader-
ship of the Supreme Court, have begun to face up to the states' obliga-
tion to assure high standards in the administration of criminal justice.
Beginning with the confession cases and extending through the right-
to-counsel and search-and-seizure cases, the courts have moved
dramatically from a passive position to one of aggressive intervention
in criminal procedure.' 0 5 It was to be expected that these currents of
change would be channelled to the problem of the indigent accused
seeking expert aid.
102In Los Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco, Memphis and Chicago the staff
includes a full-time investigator. Bliss, Defense Detective, 47 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S.
264, 265 (1956). In the District of Columbia, the recently created Legal Aid Agency
has four full-time investigators. It has sometimes employed psychiatrists on its own
initiative but, as a general matter, it uses the federal statute providing witness fees
for indigent defendants. Communication from Charles B. Murray, Director, April 16,
1962. Only six of fifty defenders responding to a questionnaire indicated the existence
of a fund for extraordinary expenses such as those for expert witnesses. See IN-
STITUTE OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIc DEFENDERS 15 (1956). A federal bill,
which would establish a public defender in the federal courts with a provision for
reimbursement "for expenses necessarily incurred by him in the performance of his
duties," presumably including experts, has repeatedly failed of passage in Congress.
H.R. 2696, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. REP. No. 232, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1959). See also Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 7 (1960).
103 See SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY DEFENDER SYSTEMS, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR
THE ACCUSED (1959).
104U.S. Dept of Justice, Press Release, April, 1961, describing the appointment
of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal
Criminal Justice; Conversations with consultants to the Ford Foundation and the
Vera Foundation. See also, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC DE-
FENDERS (1956).
105 See generally Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv.
L. Ray. 1 (1956).
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In McGarty v. O'Brien' and United States ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi,107 defendants claimed that because they had been denied a
psychiatrist of their own choice, paid by the state, they did not have
the "fair trial" which the fourteenth amendment guarantees. The
Baldi majority, in rejecting defendant's claim, held that there was no
right "to receive at public expense all the collateral assistance needed
to make" a defense. Such a principle, once established, would extend
not only "to psychiatric consultation . . . [but also] to consultation
with ballistics experts, chemists, engineers, biologists, or any type of
expert whose help in a particular case might be relevant." '08 The
dissenting judges, on the other hand, refused to class psychiatric as-
sistance as "collateral" to the making of an adequate defense. They
thought the issue should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
"[I]f . . . there are grave indicia of mental disease, and it appears
as well that counsel cannot prepare his client's case properly without
the aid of a psychiatrist, one must be appointed by the court if due
process is to be had." "0
For the court in McGarty, decisions would have to be made on
a case-by-case basis to determine "how far the state, having the ob-
ligation to afford to the accused a fair trial, a fair opportunity to make
his defense, is required under the due process clause to minimize this
disadvantage [of not having his own psychiatrist]." 11 Applying this
standard to the case before it, the court concluded that a system of
examination by a state psychiatrist was constitutionally adequate. The
state has no "constitutional obligation to promote . . . a battle of
experts by supplying defense counsel with funds wherewith to hunt
around for other experts who may be willing, as witnesses for the de-
fense, to offer the opinion that the accused is criminally insane." "I
Though less was made of it, Baldi, too, involved testimony by a court-
appointed psychiatrist. Whether due process would have been ac-
corded in either case if there had been no psychiatric examination what-
ever is left unresolved. McGarty also rejected the suggestion that the
disadvantage suffered by the defendant in not having his own psychi-
atrist might be a denial of the equal protection of the laws. It reasoned
that the disadvantage was "not imposed by the State, but results from
the financial situation in which the accused finds himself." 112
106 188 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951).
107 192 F.2d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953).
108 192 F.2d at 547.
109 Id. at 559.
110 McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 155 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928
(1951).
M1l 188 F.2d at 155.
-1 2 Id. at 157.
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Five years after Baldi and McGarty, the Supreme Court decided
Griffin v. Illinois."3 The Court held that an indigent defendant,
convicted of armed robbery and seeking to perfect an appeal, had been
deprived of equal protection of the laws when he was denied a tran-
script of his trial without charge, even though due process did not
require that he be allowed to appeal. According to Justice Black,
speaking for the Court, "There can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 114
Even if Griffin is taken to assure substantial equality rather than
complete equality, it still undercuts sharply the positions in McGarty
and Baldi. Those cases dealt more with due process than equal pro-
tection, more with minimal standards of fairness than with assuring the
poor "the kind of trial" a wealthy man gets. With the shift in em-
phasis to equal protection, the existence of a procedure for court ap-
pointment, so crucial to the earlier cases, becomes less determinative
of the issue. Although such a procedure may assure that the insanity
defense will be tried, in some minimal sense, it does not assure sub-
stantial equality in the conditions of the trial. The indigent de-
fendant remains without "his" psychiatrist to assist him in preparing
and trying his case. And he may remain without the psychiatrist
whose orientation will make the issue appear to the jury to be a sub-
stantial one. Yet these are clearly available to persons of means.
The potential applicability of Griffin to the myriad situations in
which a defendant is disadvantaged by his poverty is obvious. Cer-
tainly it portends a time when the states will have to shoulder the very
financial burdens paraded as "imaginary horribles" in Baldi. Never-
theless, the principle underlying Griffin has been extended slowly and
even grudgingly,"' perhaps because it promises so radical a revision
of the trial process. In no case has it been applied to an indigent ac-
cused asserting a right to expert assistance. Indeed, in the three cases
113 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and After-
nath, 25 U. CHI. L. Ray. 151, 156-57 (1957) ; Hamley, The Impact of Griffin v. Illi-
nois on State Court-Federal Court Relationships, 24 F.R.D. 75, 79 (1958); Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1956); Willcox
and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 COizNELL
L.Q. 1, 23 (1957).
114 351 U.S. at 19.
115 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of
Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam) ; Patterson v. Medberry,
290 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 839 (1961); United States ex rel.
Brown v. Lane, 196 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ind. 1961); People v. Berman, 19 Ill. 2d
579, 169 N.E.2d 108 (1960); People v. Wilson, 7 N.Y.2d 568, 166 N.E.2d 838, 200
N.Y.S.2d 40 (1960); People v. Breslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73, 77, 149 N.E.2d 85, 87, 172
N.Y.S.2d 157, 160 (1958). It has been suggested that the Griffin case is limited to
instances in which the exercise of a right, for example, the right to appeal, is con-
ditioned upon financial ability. See Comment, 55 MICir. L. Rav. 413, 420 (1957).
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decided since Griffin in which the issue of the "right to an expert" has
been raised, the decisions have been based principally upon non-Griffin
grounds.
In United States v. Brodson,"16 defendant had been charged with
tax evasion. In a motion to dismiss the indictment, he alleged that
the Internal Revenue Service had levied a jeopardy assessment on his
funds, and that this prevented him from retaining an accountant to
assist his counsel which, in his view, meant he was being denied either
the "effective assistance of counsel" under the sixth amendment or
a fair trial under the fifth amendment. Defendant's motion was dis-
missed principally because the court thought the issues could not be
decided until the case had been tried, since only then could it be ascer-
tained whether the services of an accountant were really necessary to
his case and whether he had in fact been unable to retain one. On
the substantive issue, the court said there was no requirement of expert
aid "invariably and as a matter of law," liT the implication being that
cases might arise in which the claim could be held to be meritorious.
The dissenters felt that Brodson was such a case. They found denial
of the effective assistance of counsel inhering in the fact that services
of an accountant were particularly crucial in a tax case."' The fact
of indigence was considered significant not in itself, however, but
rather because the government had made the defendant indigent."' 9 In
short, the implications of Griffin were not explored because the facts
and the procedural posture of Brodson made it inappropriate to do so.
State v. Crose 120 presented the issue more directly. The defendant
contended that his right to counsel under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment included within it a right to the appointment
of a psychiatrist at state expense. The court rejected the contention,
holding that the right to an expert could not be derived from the right
to counsel. Apparently, the court believed a fair trial might be con-
ducted without experts, although it conceded that, "as a practical
matter, . . . [the right to] the assistance of experts in advance of
trial often lies at the very heart of a successful defense." 121 Whether
the indigent may be denied the raw materials available to the affluent
for constructing a "successful defense," which is the Griffin point, was
not passed upon by the court.
116241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
117241 F.2d at 110.
118 Id. at 115.
3i19Id. at 111. Compare note 110 supra.
120 88 Ariz. 389, 392, 357 P.2d 136, 137 (1960).
121 Id. at 392, 357 P.2d at 138.
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The third case, Willis v. United States,"s suggested that due
process might be satisfied by virtually any psychiatric testimony bear-
ing on insanity and available to the accused. The court held that there
was no obligation on the part of the state to supply a psychiatrist for
the accused; the defense of insanity could have been raised by summon-
-ing existing fact witnesses, among whom were psychiatrists. The
equal protection issue was not raised.
Several cases now filed in the District of Columbia Circuit involve
allegations that the right to equal protection is not satisfied by a court-
appointed psychiatrist.'23 These cases are pressing the issues to solu-
tion, a solution which is likely to be consistent with the general tenor
of case law in this field. Hopefully, the day is not far off when the
state will fully assume the obligation of assuring substantial equality
in trial conditions.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the course of examining the psychiatric-assistance procedures
available to the indigent accused alleging insanity, we have seen that
the processes of criminal justice in the United States are evolving from
a relatively "pure" adversary system, with all that implies for leaving
state and accused unequal, to a system which recognizes public responsi-
bility for all facets of the administration of criminal justice. This
evolution began with judicial insistence that the prosecution assume a
divided role-not only as adversary party but also as protector of the
processes of justice. It gathered momentum with increasing recog-
nition by judges that they too had an obligation to assure a fair trial,
particularly in criminal cases. But it has not resulted in anything like
the European experience, where the state's interest in every aspect of
the trial has often led to oppression.2' Instead, a creative accommoda-
tion has occurred in which the adversary method of trial is retained
but in which the system's ultimate function is not lost sight of. Deci-
sions dealing with the right to counsel, appeals by the indigent, and
discovery are particular instances of such accommodation. Still largely
unresolved, however, is the problem considered in this Article, namely,
the extent to which the state should assure to those it prosecutes, par-
ticularly the indigent, the opportunity to present the fullest possible de-
fense. In the context of the insanity defense, several patterns exist,
some explicitly directed to the problem but most dealing with it
122 285 F.2d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
13 E.g., United States v. Naples, No. 16436, D.C. Cir., May 8, 1962.
124 See HoWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 391-94 (1931); Ploscowe, The
Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and America, 48 HARv.
L. REv. 433 (1935).
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peripherally. Counsel representing the indigent accused currently find
a patchwork of procedures upon which to draw in their quest to present
an adequate defense. Virtually n6where are they likely to find all they
will need. There seem to be just enough fragmentary devices to
satisfy the consciences of those who care more for the face of justice
than for the heart. In the long meanwhile between present half
measures and future solution, defense counsel will have to depend more
on their ingenuity and zeal than on facilities made available to them
by the state.
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APPENDIX t
Provision State coin- General
for pensation of statute
appointment defendant's providing Statutory
of impartial expert for payment provision
expert or wihesses of defendant's for rein-
government explicitly witnesses Public bursenent of
hospital authorized under certain Defender assigned
Jurisdiction examination 1 by statute 2 circumstances 3 provisionZ 4 caunsel 5
Alabama X
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas X
California X X X X X
Colorado X X **
Connecticut X X * X
Delaware X
Florida X X *
Georgia
Hawaii X X
Idaho
Illinois X
Indiana X X X
Iowa X
Kansas
Kentucky X
Louisiana X
Maine X
Maryland X
Massachusetts X X X
Michigan X X
Minnesota X
Mississippi X
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska X X
Nevada X
New Hampshire X X * X
New Jersey
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APPENDIX (Continued)
Provision State corn- General
for pensation of statute
appointment defendant's providing Statutory
of impartial expert for payment provision
expert or witnesses of defendant's for reim-
governmnt explicitly witnesses Public bursement of
hospital authorized under certain Defender assigned
Jurisdiction examination1 by statute 2 circumstances 3 provision 4 counsel 5
New Mexico
New York X X X X X
North Carolina X
North Dakota X X
Ohio X
Oklahoma X'* X
Oregon X
Pennsylvania X X
Rhode Island X X X X
South Carolina X
South Dakota X
Tennessee X
Texas X
Utah X X
Vermont X
Virginia X X
Washington
West Virginia X
Wisconsin X X *
Wyoming X X *
District of Columbia X X X
Federal X X
t This appendix is based on the materials referred to in the Article. Inevitably,
the attempt to categorize what may be a complex of law and practice will fall short
in some instances.
• Used to pay experts' professional fees. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
** Not used to pay experts' professional fees. See text accompanying note 84
smpra.
1 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
2 See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
3 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
4 See text accompanying note 100 supra.
5 See text accompanying note 94 supra.
